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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the court commited reversible error in

refusing defendant Pursifell's request that he not have to
proceed with the court-appointed defense counsel.
2.

Whether or not the performance of the court-appointed

defense counsel was such that defendant Pursifell received ineffective assistance of counsel violating his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 18, 1986 at approximately 3:40 a.m., Jason Frampton
awoke and discovered an intruder in his room at 2785 West 4682
South, West Valley (T.18).
left.

Upon Jason's awakening, the intruder

Jason awakened his father (T.20) and it was discovered

that some money and a calculator were missing from Mrs.
Frampton's purse.

The family then called the police.

After

calling the police they discovered that both of their automobiles
had been entered and the glove boxes opened (T.21).

Some cash

was missing from Jason Frampton's car (T.22) and a key to the
house was missing from Mr.

John Frampton's car (T.40).

At

approximately 4:00 a.m. Dave Trijillo awakened to an intruder
attempting to enter his home at 4233 South 2735 West, West
Valley, Utah (T.64-65).
home.

The intruder left without entering the

Dave Trijillo then called the police.

Shortly after the

Framptons called the police, the police brought two different
suspects to the home of Jason Frampton.

The second of these was

the defendant, Rick N. Pursifell, who was tentatively identified
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by Jason Frampton as the intruder (T.34).

The defendant was also

taken to Dave Trijillo's house and identified by him as the
intruder (T.69).
custody.

The defendant was then arrested and taken into

He was charged with six counts:

1.

Burglary, Second

degree, with respect to the Frampton's house; 2. Attempted
Burglary, a Third degree offense, with respect to the Trijillo
residence; 3. Vehicle Burglary, a Class A misdemeanor, for the
vehicle of John Frampton; 4. Vehicle Burglary, a Class A misdemeanor, for the vehicle of Jason Frampton; 5.

Theft, a Class B

misdemeanor, for the money taken from the vehicle of Jason
Frampton and 6. Theft, a Class B misdemeanor, for the money taken
from Mrs. John Frampton.
On March 13, 1986, Frances M. Palacios entered an appearance
of counsel for defendant Pursifell.

On May 29, 1986, defendant

Pursifell was brought to trial on all six counts.

Upon entering

the courtroom, defendant voiced an objection to being represented
by Ms. Palacios.

He indicated that he didn't wish to continue

with Ms. Palacios because he didn't feel that she had done
everything she could in his case (T.3).

He had spoken with her

once and she filed a motion to discover which he had no notice of
until two days after the hearing.

The hearing was set for April

14, 1986 and the notice sent to the defendant did not reach the
mail room in the prison until April 15, 1986.
not receive the notice until April 16, 1986.
which

The Defendant did
The information

was the subject of the discovery motion was supplied to

Ms. Palacios on the 9th of April, 1986, making the hearing on the
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defendant's discovery motion pro forma (T.6).

Judge Frederick

denied defendant's motion and the trial proceeded with Ms.
Palacios representing defendant (T.6),
The defendant was found guilty on all six counts on April
30f 1986 and was sentenced to 1-15 years on Count 1; the indeterminate term provided for by law on Count 2; 1 year on Count 3;
one year on Count 4; Six months on Count 5; and Six months on
Count 6.

All terms were to run consecutively to the term defen-

dant was presently serving and concurrently with each other.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On the morning of the appellant's trial, the appellant
informed the court that he wished to dismiss court-appointed
counsel because the appellant felt that she had not done
everything that she could to assist the appellant with his case.
Although the appellant was less than articulate in explaining and
detailing his complaints with regard to court-appointed counsel,
the trial court failed to inquire thoroughly into the appellant's
dissatisfaction with counsel or to inform appellant of his option
to proceed pro se.

The failure of the trial court to fully

explore the appellant's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel,
and the trial court's additional failure to inform the appellant
of his option to proceed pro se violated the appellant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Appellant also contends that court-appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the presentation of his defense,
and thereby violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective
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assistance and counsel.

This claim is based in part upon minimal

contact between the appellant and court-appointed counsel prior
to trial.

The claim is also grounded upon the failure of

appointed counsel to challenge:

1) the propriety of the

appellant's initial detention on the evening of his arrest;
2) the unnecessarily suggestive show-up which tainted the
reliability of the identification of the appellant by the two
witnesses who did identify him; and 3) the failure of appointed
counsel to impeach the identification testimony of one of the
witnesses with a prior inconsistent statement which had been made
to the police on the evening that the witness tentatively identified the appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT COURTAPPOINTED DEFENSE COUNSEL BE DISMISSED.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by lawf and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
This language has been read to include the right of indigents to
appointed counsel in felony prosecutions,

- 4 -

Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335f 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)f the right to
self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1974) and the right to effective assistance
of counsel.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct

1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Birt v. Montgomery, 725
F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Sixth amendment right
to counsel has four components:

right to have counsel, minimum

quality of counsel, a reasonable opportunity to select and be
represented by chosen counsel and right to preparation period
sufficient to assure minimum quality counsel); Gandy v. Alabama,
569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).

The United States Supreme

Court in Faretta, supra, said the following:
"The language and spirit of the Sixth
Amendment contemplates that counsel, like
the other defense tools guaranteed by the
amendment, shall be an aid to a willing
defendant. * * * To thrust counsel upon the
accused, against his considered wish, thus
violates the logic of the Amendment. In
such a case, counsel is not an assistant,
but a master; and the right to make a
defense is stripped of personal character
upon which the Amendment insists. * * *
An unwanted counsel 'represents1 the
defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the
accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution,
for, in a very real sense, it is not his
defense. * * *
But it is one thing to hold that every
defendant, rich or poor, has the right to
the assistance of counsel, and quite another
to say that a State may compel a defendant
to accept a lawyer he does not want. The
value of state-appointed counsel was not
unappreciated by the Founders, yet the
notion of compulsory counsel was utterly
foreign to them. And whatever else may be
- 5 -

said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights,
surely there can be no doubt that they
understood the inestimable worh of free
choice."
Thus, a defendant cannot be forced to accept counsel which
is unacceptable to him, except perhaps in extreme cases.

The

defendant must be given a free choice with respect to defense
counsel.

This does not mean that an indigent defendant has an

absolute right to choose his counsel.
appointed by the state.

His counsel will still be

A defendant does not have an absolute

right to counsel of his choice, if he is an indigent defendant.
An indigent has a much more limited right to counsel than does a
defendant who can afford to pay for his choice of counsel.
However, in certain cases, court-appointed counsel must be
replaced at the request of the defendant.

It is within the

discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not to
substitute court-appointed counsel.

In the case of People v.

Walker, 555 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976), the defendant requested, prior
to trial, that there be a substitution of counsel.

He based his

request on the fact that counsel had not consulted with him sufficiently to prepare properly for trial and on various other
disagreements with counsel's decisions.

The court denied the

motion.
"It is a matter of judicial discretion whether
to substitute court-appointed counsel in the
absence of a sufficient showing that a defendant's
right to counsel would otherwise be substantially
impaired. (Citing cases). Defendant's initial
refusal in the instant case to cooperate with
appointed counsel by itself was not sufficient
cause to require substitution of counsel (Citing
cases), and there appears to be no abuse of the
- 6 -

trial court's discretion or impairment of
defendant's right to the assistance of effective
counsel."
There are certain reasons which form a sufficient basis for
discharge of a court-appointed attorney and appointment of a new
attorney.

These reasons are discussed in the case of McKee v.

Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (Second Cir. 1981).

In that casef the

defendant requested on the first day of trial that new counsel
be assigned to him.

The judge refused this request.

Upon

appeal, the court stated that a defendant must show good cause in
order to have his counsel replaced.
"It is settled in this Circuit that f[oJnce
trial has begun. . . a defendant does not have
the unbridled right to reject assigned counsel
and demand another.' (Citing cases) This court
has long recognized that certain restraints
must be put on the reassignment of counsel lest
the right be 'manipulated so as to obstruct the
orderly procedure in the courts of to interfere
with the fair administration of justice.•
(Citing cases) Therefore, '[i]n order to warrant
a substitution of counsel during trial, the
defendant must show good cause, such as conflict
of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads
to an apparently unjust verdict.'"
The Eighth Circuit discussed the situation where substitution of counsel is appropriate and/or necessary in the case of
IJ!}i^§l-States y^^Hart, 557 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1977).

In that

case, on the day of trial, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss his appointed counsel.

The court denied this request but

on appeal the Circuit Court discussed what sorts of situations
require substitution of counsel:
"We have no quarrel with the proposition,
urged by the defendant, that an accused who
is forced to stand trial with the assistance
- 7 -

of appointed counsel with whom he has become
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict is
denied effective assistance of counsel.
(Citing cases) The trial court, when confronted by such an allegation, has an obligation to inquire thoroughly into the
factual basis of the defendant's dissatifaction (Citing cases). However, in this case,
the district court afforded Hart every
opportunity to demonstrate a basis for the
alleged irreconcilable conflict between
himself and his attorney."
The determination of whether or not to substitute counsel
lies within the discretion of the trial court, but only after
thorough questioning into the defendant's dissatisfaction.

If

the defendant is not thoroughly questioned, there is no basis for
the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting or denying
a defendant's request for substitution of counsel.
The duty which rests in the trial court to examine the
attorney-client relationship as soon as the defendant expresses
any dissatisfaction with it and to examine it thoroughly is a
very serious duty.

In the case of White v. White, 602 F.Supp.

173 (MO. WD 1984), the defendant requested several times that his
counsel be replaced.

The basis of his complaints was that the

counsel who had been assigned to him was overworked and had,
therefore, failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence
that a competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.

The court was of the opinion that when an accused is forced

to stand trial with the assistance of appointed counsel with whom
he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict, the
accused is denied effective assistance of counsel.
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"The trial court, when confronted by such an
allegation, has an obligation to inquire
thoroughly into the factual basis of the
defendant's dissatisfaction. If an attorney
and a client have an irreconcilable conflict,
essential attributes of a healty attorneyclient relationship are non-existent. * * *
. . . a careful examination into the nature
of the disagreement, its duration and the
impact it would have on the conduct of the
defense should have been conducted. . . Had
the reasons for the conflict been fully
explored, the air might have been cleared.
On the other hand, the completeness of the
rift between the two might have been
established. . . Under the circumstances,
petitioner need not show that he was actually
prejudiced by the irreconcilable conflict
with his counsel. Prejudice should be presumed from a fractured attorney-client
relationship just as it would be if the
petitioner had been denied the assistance
of counsel."
The Alaskan Court, in the case of Smith v. State, 651 P.2d
1191 (Alaska App. 1982), reinforced the importance of questioning
the defendant with respect to his dissatisfaction with his courtappointed defense counsel.

In that case, the defendant requested

that the court allow him to replace the court-appointed attorney
with an attorney of his own choice.

The court, despite the

"obvious animosity" of the defendant for the court-appointed
counsel refused the request and never questioned defendant as to
the reasons for his unhappiness.

The court forced the defendant

to choose between being represnted by the court-appointed counsel
and representing himself.
"Despite the obvious animosity on Smith's
[defendant's] part toward Ravin [defense
counsel], the court never questioned Smith
or Ravin to determine whether there was a
reasonable basis for Smith's dismissal of
Ravin; nor did the court inquire as to
- 9 -

whether Ravin thought that there was a
sufficiently serious breakdown in his
attorney-client relationship with Smith
to preclude him from continuing to act
effectively as Smith's legal counsel."
Even if substitution is not required, the defendant who does
not wish to continue with court-appointed counsel is still left
with two choices; continuing with counsel regardless of his
complaints or representing himself.

These choices must be made

clear to the defendant states the Third Circuit court in the case
of Onited^tates^y.^Welt^, 674 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir. 1982).
"Wheref on the eve of trial, a defendant seeks
new counsel, or, in the alternative, opts to
represent himself, the district court must
engage in two lines of inquiry. First, the
court must decide if the reasons for the
defendant's request for substitute counsel
constitute good cause and are thus sufficiently
substantial to justify a continuance of the
trial in order to allow new counsel to be
obtained. If the district court determines
that the defendant is not entitled to a continuance in order to engage new counsel, the
defendant is then left with a choice between
continuing with his existing counsel or proceeding to trial pro se, thus bringing into
play the court's second stage of inquiry. * * *
It is vital that the district court take
particular pains in discharging its responsibility to conduct these inquiries concerning
substitution of counsel and waiver of counsel.
Perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.
This is true even when the trial judge strongly
suspects that the defendant's requests are
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate
the judicial process and to delay the trial.
Although such improper tactics by an accused
cannot be allowed to succeed, at the same time,
a trial cannot be permitted to go forward when
a defendant does not fully appreciate the
impact of his actions on his fundamental constitutional rights.
When a defendant requests a substitution of
counsel on the eve of trial, the district court
must engage in at least some inquiry as to the
reason for the defendant's dissatisfaction with
his existing attorney. * * *
- 10 -

If the district court has made the appropriate
inquiries and has determined that a continuance
for substitution of counsel is not warranted,
the court can then properly insist that the
defendant choose between representation by his
existing counsel and proceeding pro se."
When Defendant Pursifell informed the court that he wished
not to proceed with defense counsel, Judge Frederick failed to
inquire thoroughly into defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel
or to inform him of his option to proceed pro se.

Defendant's

request is found on page 3 of the transcript:
Mr. Pursifell: It's that I don't wish to
proceed with Ms. Palacios, because I don't
feel she's done everything that she could
in my case.
The Court: In what specific way hasn't she
represented your interest?
Mr. Pursifell: I feel that she hasn't
altogether got my case together right, and I
feel that if I proceed with Ms. Palacios, that
it's not going to be fair for me to go to
trial with her. I have talked to her once
before she just closed information or a Motion
to Discover, and I didn't know she was going
to do so that. I got a letter in the mail
saying she did that two days after the hearing
happened, and I feel that before she done that,
I should have been notified of what she was
doing. . .
The rest of the discussion centered on Mr. Pursifell's knowledge
of that hearing.

There was no further discussion of Ms.

Palacios' knowledge of the case, meetings with the defendant or
any other dissatisfaction Pursifell may have had with Ms.
Palacios.

The court, after discussing the defendant's notice

with respect to the Motion to Discover determined that Ms.
Palacios "has done a very good job with regard to representing
your interests in this matter.

She's proceeded in an orderly

- 11 -

fashion, as is my experience, in her efforts on criminal defense
cases.

Your motion, therefore, to terminate her services in this

matter and to continue the trial is denied."
tinued.

The trial then con-

There was never any mention of defendant's option to

proceed pro se, nor was there any further inquiry into any other
problems defendant may have had with Ms. Palacios.

There was

some indication that Ms. Palacios had only communicated with
defendant once prior to trial, but that matter was never probed
by the trial court.

The matter was not discussed again.

The

failure of Judge Fredericks to fully explore defendant's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, and his failure to inform defendant of his option to proceed pro se violated defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to efficient counsel.
POINT_II
THE PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS SUCH
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
VIOLATING HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution not
only guarantees a defendant the right to counsel but, as mentioned in Point I, it also guarantees that indigent defendants
will be appointed counsel by the state for felony trial, Gideon
v. Wainwright, supra, and that the assistance of counsel must be
effective to meet Sixth Amendment standards, McMann y. Richardson,
supra.

Even if a defendant had state-appointed counsel, in order

for the demands of the Sixth Amendment to be met, that counsel
must render effective assistance.

In order to determine whether
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or not the assistance given by defense counsel was "effective",
we must look to the services rendered.

The Supreme Court of Utah

has discussed the question of effectiveness of counsel in several
cases.

One of the earliest of these cases is State v. McNicol,

554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976).

In that case, defendant was on trial

for the crime of murder in the second degree.

After his trial,

he appealed on the grounds that his representation by appointed
counsel was so inadequate as to violate his right to counsel as
guaranteed by Article 1, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, and by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution.
The defendant based his appeal on the fact that:

1) the trial

was very brief, 2) defense counsel assserted very few objections,
3) the direct examination of defendant was brief and failed to
cover areas which might relate to possible defenses, 4) defense
counsel did not pursue certain matters which defendant felt he
should have pursued and 5) defense counsel asserted no objection
to the twenty exhibits introduced into evidence.

The court had

this to say:
"This court has previously held the right
of the accused to have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance
in the record by an attorney who manifests no
real concern about the interests of the
accused. He is entitled to the assistance of
a competent member of the Bar, who shows a
willingness to identify himself with the
interests of the accused and present such
defenses as are available under the law and
consistent with the ethics of the profession."
The question of whether or not a defense counsel has rendered ineffective assistance is not simply answered by looking at
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defendant's satisfaction with defense counsel.
must fail to represent defendant's interests.

Defense counsel
In the case of

State^v^^Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), the Court makes this
very clear.

In that case, the defendant complained on appeal of

the assistance of counsel:
"The mere assertion of such a charge does
not prove che fact. This is especially so
because the assertion is suffused with such
self-interest that the trial court is not
bound to believe it."
One area where counsel can be shown to be deficient is in
the area of objections.

Where counsel fails to make crucial and

necessary objections, the interests of the defendant are certainly not represented.

However, where the objections would be

futile, they are not an appropriate basis for the finding of
ineffective assistance.
"In State_v._GraXr Utah, 601 P.2d 918 (1979),
we held that the accused has a right to effective counsel who does more than satisfy a
pretense of representation. We stated that the
defendant bears the burden of establishing
ineffectiveness. The proof must be demonstrable,
not speculative. * * * In Heinlin v. Smith, 542
P.2d 1081 (1975), we held that the failure of
counsel to make motions or objections which would
be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.
* * * The trial court found the admission of
expert testimony based upon official weather
reports was 'clearly admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule. ' We agree. It is therefore understandable why trial counsel made no
objection. Effective representation does not
require counsel to object when doing so would
be futile. (SJtate_v^J4almrose, 649 P. 2d 56,
Utah 1982).
Defense counsel, in the case at hand, barely presented a
defense.

Her only actions in court were to give a two page
- 14 -

opening statement, make five objections during testimony and
cross-examine the prosecutor's witnesses.

Her actions before

the trial include being entered as counsel, requesting relevant
information from the prosecutor, filing a Motion to Discover when
the information was not received, requesting that the trial be
rescheduled, and submitting three requested instructions.

The

day of trial, the defendant requested that defense counsel be
replaced.

His request was denied perfunctorily.

Other oversights on the part of the defense counsel include
failure to object and failure to introduce necessary evidence.
When cross-examining Jason Frampton, Ms. Palacios attempted to
impeach his testimony with regard to the length of time he had to
view the intruder in his home.

On page 28 of the transcript she

asked the witness:
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Now, do you recall giving a statement to
the police officer about what you saw?
Yes.
And do you recall telling him that at the
time that the person was at the door, that
he immediately ran? Do you recall telling
him that, that the suspect immediately
turned and began to run?
He immediately turned after I said hello
to him.
But my question was, do you remember
telling him that?
I don't remember telling him that.

At that time, it would have been logical for defense counsel to
have introduced the inconsistent statement made by Jason Frampton
to the police to impeach his testimony regarding identification.
Counsel never attempted to introduce the statement and demonstrate
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the difference in his statement and his testimony at trial.
On page 41 of the transcript, John Frampton repeated what he
had overheard his son say to the police during Jason's identification of defendant.
evidence as hearsay.

Ms. Palacios failed to object to the

There was no objection when Mrs. Frampton

also repeated what she had heard her son say to the police when
identifying the defendant.

On page 62, during Dave Trijillo's

testimony, he made references to the fact that a short time
earlier, "we just had another robber come in our house and try to
rape my little sister."

No motion was made by Ms. Palacios to

strike the statement as prejudicial or have the jury instructed
to ignore the statement.
Ms. Palacios failed to file a pretrial motion challenging
the lawfulness of the initial detention of the defendant by the
arresting officers.

Ms. Palacios also failed to file any

pretrial motion to exclude the identification of the defendant on
the grounds that it was unnecessarily suggestive.

She also

failed to object at trial to the identification of the defendant
notwithstanding that 1) the police informed both witnesses who
identified the defendant that he had been found in the area;
2) the defendant was identified while in police custody and alone;
and 3) there was no line-up.

Although David Trijillo testified

that there was a chance that the defendant had touched the glass
doors of his home, he did not recall that any fingerprints were
taken.

No questions were asked by defense counsel during her

cross-examination of the police officers involved why no
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fingerprints were taken, or in fact, if any were taken.
As stated by defendant during his request for different
defense counsel, defense counsel only spoke to the defendant
once prior to trial.

He was not informed of counsel's actions.

Under these circumstances, defense counsel's assistance to defendant was ineffective and therefore violated his right to counsel
as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12, Constitution of
Utah.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's convictions should be reversed and he
should be granted a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Xg

day of March, 1987.
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